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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880301-CA 
v. : 
JULIO GODINEZ, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for Unlawful 
Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(l)(a)(i) [or (iv)] (1986) (Amended 1987). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
Whether there is sufficient evidence to support the 
jury's verdict conviction defendant. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The State relies on the following statutory provision 
in this matter. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) and (iv) (1986) 
(Amended 1987): 
(1) Prohibited acts A - Penalties 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, 
it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or 
dispense, or to possess with 
intent to produce, manufacture, 
or dispense, a controlled or 
counterfeit substance; 
• • • • 
(iv) possess a controlled or 
counterfeit substance with intent 
to distribute 
(b) Any person convicted of violating 
Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in 
Schedule I or II is guilty of a 
second degree felony. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Julio Godinez, was charged with Possession 
of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(i) 
(1986) (Amended 1987). The correct citation for that violation 
is Utah Code Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) but the Information lists 
subsection (i) with the language of Possession with Intent to 
Distribute. 
Defendant was convicted of Possession of a Controlled 
Substance with Intent to Distribute for Value, on March 25, 1988, 
following a jury trial in the Third Judicial District Court, the 
Honorable John A. Rokich, Judge, presiding. Defendant was 
sentenced by Judge Rokich on May 9, 1988, to the Utah State 
Prison for not less than one year nor more than fifteen years and 
ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $10,000. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 9, 1987, Detective William McCarthy 
conducted surveillance on the Motel 6 located as Sixth South and 
200 East, Salt Lake City (T. 72-73). The detective was assigned 
to watch specifically Room 223 of the Motel as well as a suspect 
vehicle described as a Plymouth 4-door, license plate number 
821BJC (T. 75-76). Upon arrival at 3:15 p.m., the detective 
spotted the suspect vehicle parked in the motel parking lot, and 
also observed at least two individuals inside Room 223 (T. 78). 
About one hour later, two people, later identified as Mr. Julio 
Godinez and Fernando Florez, left Room 223, walked around the 
building, and proceeded to Room 225 (T. 78-80). Rooms 223 and 
225 of the Motel 6 are on the same level, same side, and are 
separated by a single room (T. 112). Mr. Godinez opened the door 
with a key and both men walked inside (T. 84). The two men 
remained in Room 225 for approximately seven minutes then left 
again, going around the building, and re-entering Room 223 (T. 
84-86). About one-half hour later, John Pender (an informant) 
and Pablo Lafarga went to Room 223 (T. 86-87). Lafarga carried a 
brown paper bag (T. 87). They were there about one minute when 
Mr. Godinez and Fernando once again left, went around the 
building, and proceeded to Room 225, but did not enter (T. 88-
89). Mr. Godinez went downstairs to the parking lot and opened 
the suspect vehicle, possibly for a key to the room, thereafter 
both men entered Room 225 (T. 89-91). 
About ten minutes later Mr. Godinez and Fernando left 
Room 225, went around the building, and entered Room 223 (T. 92). 
At this point all the individuals that Detective McCarthy had 
seen were in Room 223 (T. 92). They were there only minutes when 
Pender left (T. 92). About twenty minutes later, Mr. Godinez and 
Fernando left Room 223, went around the building, and entered 
Room 225 (T. 92). Fernando carried something in his coat which 
Detective McCarthy could readily observe from a distance of less 
than two hundred feet but he couldn't tell what it was (T. 92). 
Mr. Godinez opened the door and let Fernando in Room 225 (T. 93). 
Five or six minutes later, Mr. Godinez left Room 225, "went his 
normal route," and returned to Room 225 approximately nine 
minutes later (T. 93). About one hour later, Lafarga exited Room 
223 only to pace on the balcony and return to Room 223 (T. 93-
94). Pender returned and went to Room 223, eventually leaving 
with LaFarga (T. 94). 
Later Mr, Godinez and Fernando left Room 225, went 
around the building and entered Room 223 (T. 95). Thereafter Mr. 
Godinez and Fernando exited Room 223 and proceeded toward the van 
of Detective Mc Carthy, a possible counter-surveillance maneuver 
(T. 95-96, 120). Fernando walked on the east side of the street, 
pacing back and forth, standing back in the bushes in the shadows 
of a wall (T. 96, 99). Mr. Godinez crossed the street to the 
west side, walked up to the surveillance van and attempted to 
look inside; at that point the detective called for a back-up (T. 
96-97, 137). Mr. Godinez then returned to Room 225, and Fernando 
returned to Room 223. 
Based on what the officers had seen they sought a 
telephonic search warrant. While waiting for the warrant, 
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Detective McCarthy and another officer entered Room 225 with a 
passkey (T. 100). Mr. Godinez was alone in the room, sitting on 
the bed (T. 100). He was patted down, but no weapons were found 
(T. 101-03). A similar entry was made into Room 223 by other 
officers (T. 103). Once the search warrant arrived, the room was 
searched (T. 105). The bed Mr. Godinez was sitting on was 
searched by the police and a plastic bag was found under the 
pillow between the mattress and the headboard; the bag contained 
approximately one pound of cocaine (T. 107-08, 182, 202). A 
bindle of a different strength cocaine was found in a cup in the 
bathroom (T. 157, 182). Mr. Godinez was relatively calm until 
the cocaine was discovered in the bed (T. 181). At the time of 
the discovery, Mr. Godinez had a look of "surprise" and "dismay," 
appearing extremely nervous, raising up and down from his chair, 
and recrossing his legs several times (T. 167-68). During this 
time Mr. Godinez "defecated himself" (T. 109). 
Mr. Godinez communicated to the police that he was a 
jewelry salesman in Salt Lake to sell jewelry (T. 151). He also 
indicated that he had been in Salt Lake three days, and was the 
sole occupant of Room 225, having had no visitors (T. 151-52). 
At the time of the arrest Mr. Godinez admitted that he had sold 
no jewelry (T. 152). 
Along with the cocaine, the police recovered a ring 
display box with rings inside, a suitcase, a briefcase containing 
miscellaneous items, personal items belonging to Mr. Godinez, 
including a wallet and items of identification, along with three 
airline passes round-trip from Los Angeles to Salt Lake via 
Tucson (T. 105, 154, 162, 164, 202). Items of luggage, a 
briefcase and other personal items were found in the room but the 
record does not specify to whom they belonged (T. 2020). The 
airplane tickets were made out to Mr* Godinez using his middle 
name (T. 153-54, 169-70). Scales were found in Room 223 (T. 
206). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based on the officers' observations during surveillance 
and the statements made by defendant at his arrest, there is 
sufficient nexus between the defendant and the contraband seized 
to support the jury's verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE WAS PRODUCED AT TRIAL TO 
SUSTAIN DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION OF POSSESSION 
OF COCAINE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. 
Defendant's appeal arises out of his conviction of 
Possession of Cocaine with the Intent to Distribute. Utah Code 
Ann. S 58-37-8(1)(a) (1986) (Amended 1987) provides: 
Except as authorized by this chapter, it is 
unlawful for any person to knowingly and 
intentionally • . . (i) to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with 
intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, 
a controlled or counterfeit substance; [or] 
. . . [to] (iv) possess a controlled or 
counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
Under this statutory language the prosecution was 
required to prove: (1) defendant knowingly and intentionally 
possessed; (2) a controlled substance; and (3) he had the intent 
to distribute the same. The jury, as trier of fact, found the 
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evidence was sufficient to establish these elements beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Defendant's sole contention in Point I of his brief is 
that the prosecution failed to establish the element of 
possession. He claims that the State did not show that he had 
actual or even constructive possession of the controlled 
substances because of the nonexclusive use of the motel room 
where the controlled substance was found, that others did in fact 
share his room at least some of the time. 
As a general principle, to successfully challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence sustaining his conviction, defendant 
must show "that the evidence was so inconclusive or insubstantial 
that a reasonable mind must have entertained a reasonable doubt 
that defendant committed the crime." State v. Carlson, 635 P.2d 
72, 74 (Utah 1981) . 
The Utah Supreme Court in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 
(Utah 1983), specifically set forth the standard for reversing a 
conviction on insufficient evidence: 
In considering that question, we review the 
evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the verdict of the jury. We 
reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence, so viewed, 
is so inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant committed the crime 
of which he was convicted. 
Id. at 44 (emphasis added). With respect to the sufficiency of 
the State's evidence to establish the element of possession, the 
State concedes that defendant was not in actual physical 
possession of the controlled substance at the time it was 
discovered and seized by officers. However, the evidence in this 
case, when viewed as a whole, was sufficient to establish 
defendant's constructive possession of cocaine beyond a 
reasonable doubt. The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
constructive possession is sufficient to establish the element of 
possession of controlled substance. The doctrine of constructive 
possession was stated in State v. Echevarrieta, 621 P.2d 709 
(Utah 1980): 
Constructive possession is generally applied 
to those circumstances where the drug is not 
found on the person of the defendant nor in 
his presence, but is found in a place under 
his dominion and control and under 
circumstances which it can be reasonably 
inferred that the defendant had actual 
knowledge of the existence of the narcotics. 
Exclusive control of the place in which the 
narcotics are found is not necessary. 
Id. at 712. 
The Court in the recent case of State v. Bingham, 732 
P.2d 132 (Utah 1987), upheld a conviction for possession of 
marijuana with the intent to distribute for value under the 
constructive possession theory stating: 
Constructive possession is proved by 
establishing a connection between the accused 
and the drug sufficient to permit an 
inference that the accused had both the 
ability and the intent to exercise dominion 
or control over it. 
Ld. at 133, citing State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985). 
The State clearly established defendant's dominion and 
control over Room 225 at Motel 6, where the cocaine was 
discovered. The defendant indicated to the police at the time of 
his arrest that he was the sole occupant of Room 225 at Motel 6, 
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having had no visitors (T. 151, 152). Though it was established 
that others had visited the room for short periods of time on the 
night of the arrest, the surveillance officer testified that each 
time Room 225 was entered, it was made accessible by defendant 
with his key (T. 89-91, 93). Further, it was established that 
most of the items seized in Room 225 at the time of the arrest 
were attributable to defendant, including his personal 
possessions, a ring box, and three airline tickets (T. 105, 154, 
164). Finally, defendant was the only individual present in Room 
225 at the time of the arrest and was sitting on the bed where 
the drug was discovered (T. 101). 
In State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316 (Utah 1985), the Court 
indicated that "whether a sufficient nexus between the accused 
and the drug exists depends upon the facts and circumstances of 
each case." Ici. at 319, citing State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 
1264 (Utah 1983). As indicated by the appellant, the Court in 
Fox held that: 
ownership and/or occupancy of the premises 
upon which the drugs are found, although 
important factors, are not alone sufficient 
to establish constructive possession, 
especially when occupancy is not exclusive. 
Id., citing United States v. Davis, 562 F.2d 681, 693 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). But the Court in Fox went on to say that other factors 
-might combine to show a nexus between the accused and the drug." 
Id. These factors include "incriminating behavior of the 
accused," Id., citing United States v. Garcia, 655 F.2d 59 (5th 
Cir. 1981): "presence of drugs in a specific area over which the 
accused had control . . . " Ld*' citing Walker v. United States, 
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489 F.2d 714 (8th Cir. 1974) and "presence of drug paraphernalia 
among the accused's personal effects or in a place over which the 
accused has special control." Id., citing United States v. 
James, 494 F.2d 1007, 1030-31 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The State 
submitted sufficient evidence that the jury could have found that 
the defendant had constructive possession of the cocaine. 
The bahavior of the defendant was incriminating. 
Defendant went back and forth between Rooms 225 and 223 a number 
of times on the night of the arrest. Each time the defendant 
changed rooms, he chose to walk around the building before 
entering the other room (T. 80, 84, 88-89, 92-93, 95), even 
though Rooms 225 and 223 were on the same level, same side and 
separated by only a single room (T. 112). Further, defendant and 
Fernando exited the Motel in a possible counter-surveillance 
maneuver (T. 95-96, 260). Defendant approached and attempted to 
look inside the surveillance van, while Fernando took a position 
across the street in the shadows near a wall and in some bushes 
(T. 96-97, 99, 137). Moreover, defendant acted relaxed up until 
the time the drugs were discovered (T. 181). At that time his 
behavior changed dramatically as defendant became extremely 
nervous, moving up and down from his chair and crossing his legs 
back and forth (T. 167-68). Defendant finally "defecated 
himself" (T. 109). Finally, the airline tickets seized at the 
time of the arrest were somewhat suspiciously made out to the 
defendant using his middle name (T. 153-54, 169-70). There was 
no clear explanation as to why the defendant had done so, 
although it was testified that other identification seized by the 
officers was in the defendant's first name (T. 153, 162). Other 
incriminating behavior includes the defendant's association with 
the individuals in Room 225 and his entrance into the suspect 
vehicle (T. 88-89). 
There was the presence of drugs in a specific area over 
which the defendant had control. As indicated earlier, the 
defendant explained that he was the sole occupant of Room 225; 
access by other individuals was made possible by the defendant 
with his key. Further, the one pound block of cocaine was found 
on the very bed on which the defendant was sitting when the 
officers entered Room 225 at the time of the arrest (T. 101, 107-
08). 
Finally, there was the presence of drug paraphernalia 
among a place where the defendant had special control. The 
cocaine found in Room 225 was approximately in a one half kilo 
(one pound) block. It is logical that prior to any type of sale 
the block would be weighed to determine its exact weight. A 
scale capable of measuring minute amounts of any substance and 
which can be used for weighing drugs was discovered in Room 223. 
Though it is clear that the defendant did not have exclusive 
control or occupancy of Room 223, he did in fact enter that room 
on a number of occasions during the night of the arrest, his 
access thereto was presumably never denied. Therefore, the State 
maintains that such access to Room 223 allowed the defendant to 
have special control over the items therein, including the 
scales. 
Defendant in his brief has given other explanations for 
his actions. Though other explanations are possible, they are 
not logical in light of the immense circumstancial evidence 
indicating the defendant had constructive possession of the 
cocaine. Nonetheless, these other explanations need not be 
accepted by this Court, for this Court under the standard set 
forth in State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983), must review 
"the evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn 
from it in the light most favorable to the verdict of the jury." 
Id. at 444. The jury obviously did not accept defendant's 
explanation of his activities that evening. There is nothing 
inherently improbable in the version of the facts accepted by the 
jury which could cause this Court to reverse defendant's 
conviction. The evidence in this case was sufficient to sustain 
defendant's conviction of possession of cocaine with intent to 
distribute. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, this Court should 
affirm defendant's conviction. » 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ) day of November, 
1988. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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